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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
garded as incidental consequences of the exercise of power to aid naviga-
tion for which no compensation need be made.21
Holdings to the effect that only direct floodings of land amount to a
"taking" whereas such injuries as impaired drainage are merely conse-
quential, seem to be an instance of the courts' falling err to what Justice
Cardozo called "the tyranny of labels."22 In these cases the rule is given as
the reason.23 Some courts, however, have based similar holdings on a reluc-
tance to require the government to foresee all the possible damage that
may result from its improvement activities.2 4
The decision in the principal case has two practical effects. The first,
following the rule in the Gress case, is that the paramount power to improve
navigation goes no further than the bed of the stream which is bounded
by its natural banks. The other is a broademng of the concept of a "taking"
to include damages caused by an underground invasion of percolating
waters as well as surface flooding. Both rules defimtely restrict the United
States in the full use of its dominant servitude in a navigable stream.
Whether these restrictions are applicable only to the present facts or will be
extended to others remains to be seen.
GORDON E. NEUENSCHwANDER
LABOR LAW -CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENTS
-DISCHARGE FOR RIVAL UNION ACTIVITY
An employer and its employees' representative umon entered into a
clbsed shop agreement.' The contract was renewed after four years dura-
tion on July 24, 1945, for an indefinite period. On July 26, 1945, certain
employees began open agitation for a change in bargaining representative.
These employees were expelled from the representative union for rival union
activity. Knowing this, the employer subseqeuntly discharged them on
demand of the union in compliance with the closed shop agreement. The
2
'Goodman v. United States, 113 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1940). If a government pro-
ject results only in temporary invasion or consequential injury, no implied obligation
to compensate riparian owner can rise. Comment, supra note 13, at 673, 674.
2Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 151 (1937); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114, 54 Sup.Ct. 330, 335 (1934).
'For an excellent example of this weakness, see Lynn v. United States, 110 F. 2d
586, 589, (5th Cir. 1940). See also United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 23
Sup.Ct 349 (1903).
2 
"The damages sustained by the owner must be within the contemplation or rea-
sonably to be anticipated by the Government when the dam was erected." Atkinson
v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D. Minn. 1946); John Horstmann Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 138, 42 Sup.Ct. 58 (1921).
1
"The employees covered by this agreement shall be members in good standing of
the Union and the Employer shall employ no workers other than members of the
Union. "' 70 N.L.R.B. 1202, 1214 (1946). Union security agreements are
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employer was found by the National Labor Relations Board2 to have vio-
lated sections 8(1) and 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act3 by
reason of its "discrimination in regard to tenure of employment," there-
by discouraging membership in the rival union and interfering with the
right of the employees to choose their own bargaining representative. The
Court of Appeals entered a decree enforcing the Board's order.4 Certiorari
was granted by the Supreme Court. Held, that since the employer had car-
ried out the collective bargaining contract in good faith, he was not guilty
of an unfair labor practice.
The Court in the principal case was confronted with apparently con-
flicting provisions of the NLRA. By the proviso to section 8(3), an
employer and the labor organization elected by the employees as their
bargaining representative were permitted to require membership in the
representative organization as a condition of employment. By
section 7,6 employees were given the right to change their bargaining
representative.7 However, the existing representative union could expel
members participating in activities intended to result in a change of repre-
sentative, and, once expelled, these employees were ineligible under the
classified as (1) closed shop, providing that only persons already union members
shall be hired; (2) union shop, providing that all persons hired must become union
members within a certain period of time; or (3) mamtenance-of-menhership, pro-
viding that all workers who are already union members must remain union mem-
bers in good standing as a condition of employment. TELLER, LABoR DisPuTEs
AND COLLECrIVE BARGAI ,NG § 398.58 (Supp. 1948).
'Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1946).
' "§ 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of
this act. . (3) by disciminaton in regard to hire-or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization: Provuied, that nothing [in this act] or in any other statute
of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined
(in this act] as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees
as provided in section 9 (a) in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by
such agreement when made." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(1), (3)
(1946) (Wagner Act).
'Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. N.L.R.B., 171 F.2d 956 (1949).
i338 U.S. 355, 70 Sup. Ct. 166 (1949).
"§ 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1946) (Wagner Act).
7
" ere is no question but that the discharges had the effect of interfering with the
employees' right, given by § 7 of the Act, to self-organization and to collective bar-
gaimng through representatives of their own choosing." Colgate-Palmolive-Peer
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 338 U.S. 355, 360, 70 Sup. Ct 166, 169 (1949).
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dosed shop agreement to continue in their employment. On demand by the
representative union for the discharge of these employees, the employer
either had to discharge the employees, risking a charge of unfair labor
practice, or had to breach its agreement with the representative union.
Since 1942, the NLRB had refused to permit an employer to discharge
employees pursuant to a valid dosed shop contract when, to the employer's
knowledge,9 the union had expelled the employees for seeking to change
their bargaining representative at an appropriate time.10 This NLRB
policy, known as the Rutland Court doctrine, was approved in the Second,1"
'Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 587 (1942), 46 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1942).
For a discussion of this and related cases see: 2 TELLER, LABOR DIsPuTES AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 324 (1940 and Cum. Supp. 1946); Cushman, The
Duration of Certifications by the NLRB and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability,
45 MIcH. L REv. 1, 32 (1946); Frieden, Some New Discharge Problems Under Un-
son Security Covenants, [1946] WIs. L REV. 440,448-51; Murdock, Some Aspects of
Employee Democracy Under the Wagner Act, 32 CORNELL L. Q. 73, 94 (1946);
Notes, Effect of a Closed Shop Contract on Employer Practices Otherwise Unfair
Under the NLRA, 56 HARv. L. REv. 613, 617, (1943), Change of Bargaining
Representative During the Life of a Collective Agreement Under the Wagner Act,
51 YALE L. J. 465, 467 (1942), Discharge Based on Union Reprisal for Support
of Rival Union Under the NLRA, 56 YALE L. J. 1048, 1049 (1947), 33 VA. L.
REv. 521, 522 (1947)
'Durasteel Company, 73 N.L.R.B. 941 (1947) (employer held to have knowledge
where he knew employees were engaging in rival union activity, but made no effort
to determine to what extent dual unionism motivated expulsion); Lewis Meier &
Co., 73 N.LR.B. 520 (1947) (where employer is advised by rival union of pos-
sible reprisals against its adherents, employer has duty to inquire as to expulsions);
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1946) (employer should have real-
ized from his general knowledge of the rival union activity the motivation of the
expulsions); Portland Lumber Mills, 64 N.L.R.B. 159 (1945) (employer held to
have knowledge when discharged employee had acted as observer for rival union in
Board election and employer knew this, but did not inquire as to whether this was
the sole reason for the employee's expulsion) But cf. Spicer Mfg. Corp., 70
N.L.R.B. 41 (1946) (knowledge by foreman not imputed to employer where em-
ployee did not specifically request that employer be informed); Diamond T Motor
Car Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 1225 (1945) (knowledge by foreman of expelled employee's
rival union activity not imputed to employer).
" Portland Lumber Mills, 64 N.L.R.B. 159 (1945) (one month before expiration of
a year contract); Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 878 (1946) (two months
before expirauon of the contract and six weeks before operative date of an auto-
matic renewal); Geraldine Novelty Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1947) (two months
before expiration of the original contract notwithstanding the existence of a renewal
agreement which had been entered into by employer and representative union
shortly after rival union activity began) Public Service Co-ordinated Transport,
77 N.L.R.B. 153 (1948) (four months before expiration of the contract and less
than two months preceding automatic renewal date); Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.,
70 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1946) (later in the same month as the signing of a renewal
of a contract already in existence more than four years); Rheem Mfg. Co., 70
N.L.R.B. 57 (1946) (seven months after oral agreement by employer and union
extending provisions of expired closed shop contract) But cf. Southwestern Port-
land Cement Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1 (1945) (employees activity a few months after
signing of a contract was not at the appropriate time).
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Third,' 2 and Ninth13 Circuits, but was in effect, overruled in the Seventh34
Expressly rejecting the Rutland Court doctrine, the Supreme Court in the
principal case stated that Congress had been aware of the interference which
dosed shop contracts would create with the employees' right to change their
bargaining representative,' 5 and that the proviso permitting such contracts
could not be defeated through administrative amendment by the NLRB.
The decision in the principal case does not affect the Supreme Court's
previous holding16 that a union shop contract entered into by an employer
with the knowledge that the representative union intended to request the
discharge of former adherents of a rival union is invalid as a defense to
charges of discriminatory discharges. So also, a union shop contract made
by an employer with a company-dominated or company-assisted union is
invalid and will not protect the employer from charges of discriminatory
discharges.'
The significance of the principal case lies in its holding that, under
the NLRA, the employer's carrying out a valid dosed shop agreement in
For a discussion of Board policy with regard to duration of Board certification
of unions see: Cushman, The Duration of Certifications by the NLRB and the
Doctrine of Administrative Stability, 45 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1946); Murdock, Some
Aspects of Employee Democracy Under the Wagner Act, 32 CORNELL L Q. 73
(1946); Note, Change of Bargaining Representative During the Life of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement Under the Wagner Act, 51 YALE L. J. 456 (1942).
'N.L.R.B. v. Geraldine Novelty Co., 173 F.29 14 (2d Cir. 1949), enforcing 74
N.L.R.B. 1503 (1947); Colonie Fibre Co. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1947),
enforcing 69 N.L.R.B. 589 (1946), 71 N.L.R.B. 354 (1946); N.L.R.B. v. American
White Cross aboratories, 160 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1947), enforcing 66 N.L.R.B. 866
(1946).
"NL.R.B. v. Public Service Transportation Co., 177 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1949),
eaforcing 77 N.R.B. 153 (1948). This decision was modified after the principal
case was decided. The court had found as part of its decree that the discharged
employee was protected under the Rutland doctrine. However, in view of the de-
cision in the principal case, the court agreed with the contention of both the employer
and the Board that its former decree should be modified to the extent of finding
the discharge non-discriminatory. 50 A.LC. 106 (3d Cir. 1950).
'N.L.R.B. v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 171 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1949), enforcing
70 N.LR.B. 1202 (1946); Local 2880, Lumber & Sawmill Workers v. N.L.R.B.,
158 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1946), enforcing 64 N.L.R.B. 159 (1945).
SA4 lummnum Co. v. N.L.R.B., 159 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1946), reversing 68 N.L.R.B.
750 (1946); Lewis Meier & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 21 L.R.R.M. 2093 (7th Cit. 1947),
reversing 73 N.L.R.B. 520 (1947).
15338 U.S. 355 at 363, 70 Sup. Cr. 166 at 171.
"
0Wallace Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248, 65 Sup. Ct. 238 (1944), affirming
141 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1944), enforcing 50 N.L.R.B. 138 (1943), rehearing de-
nied, 324 U.S. 885, 65 Sup. Cr. 682 (1945); Cliffs Dow Chemical Co., 64
N.L.R.B. 1419 (1945).
t Wallace Corp. v. N.L.R.B., supra note 16; Julius Resnick, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 184
(1947); Pacific Plaster & Mfg. Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 52 (1946); Tappan Stove Co.,
66 N.LR.B. 759 (1946); Lane Lifeboat &.Davit Corp., 60 N.L.R.B. 473 (1945);
McGough Bakeries Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 849 (1944).
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